Full as-built reference: run/auth (dev tokens), conventions (idempotency, tenancy,
error codes), every REST endpoint across health/dev/interactions/threads/inbox/
support/adapters/routes/ai/calendar with request/response shapes, the kernel-client
+ 6 React hook SDKs, a curl QA quickstart + the 8 smoke scripts, env var reference,
and enum vocabularies.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task T3.4: OutboundService gains a per-tenant egress cap (tenantLimit/tenantWindowMs,
IIOS_TENANT_OUTBOUND_*) counting a scope's commands in the window — a noisy tenant
is RATE_LIMITED while others keep sending (noisy-neighbor protection). Persists
scopeId on every command (fixes the previously-unscoped table). resolveScope assigns
IiosScope.cellId (IIOS_CELL_ID, default cell-default) — the cell-partition hook.
Tests: per-tenant cap isolates tenants; new scopes carry a cellId.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task T3.3: isolation.spec.ts — two tenants (org_A/org_B) on the same app. Proves
tenant B is denied on approve/getArtifact/accept/getMeeting/summarize of A's
resources, B's lists (decisions/artifacts/meetings) show none of A's, the denied
calls neither mutate A's data nor create a scope for B, and each tenant sees only
its own lists. The mandated one-DB tenant-isolation test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task T3.2: AiJobService.getArtifact/accept/reject assertOwns on artifact.job.scopeId;
listArtifacts scoped to caller. CalendarService.getMeeting/setConsent/generateTranscript/
summarize/listActionItems assertOwns on meeting.scopeId (optional principal → asserts
when supplied by a controller, skipped for internal calls). MessageService.getMessageById
gains the same optional fence. Controllers thread the principal through. All 46
ai/calendar/routing/messaging tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task T3.1: ActorResolver gains findScope (no-create) + assertOwns(principal,
resourceScopeId) → ForbiddenException on mismatch (KG-02). RouteService.approve/
deny now assertOwns on the decision's binding scope before mutating; listDecisions
is scoped to the caller. Fixes the critical cross-tenant mutation (tenant A could
approve tenant B's route). Also adds IiosScope.cellId + IiosOutboundCommand.scopeId
columns (migration tenant-isolation) + cell assignment on scope create. Test:
another tenant approving → Forbidden, decision unchanged, no scope created, empty list.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task S2.3: capability smoke asserts the CMP consent gate is consulted at egress
(NOT_REQUIRED → send proceeds); the DENY→BLOCKED and ALLOW→receipt paths are
unit-covered. Slice-2 verification: 110 tests green, pnpm -r build all packages,
boundary clean, capability smoke PASS, all prior smokes (realtime/inbox/support/
adapter/route/ai/calendar) still pass through the consent-gated broker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task S2.2: OutboundService.send gains an optional purpose, passes it to the broker,
and persists the returned consentReceiptRef on IiosOutboundCommand (new nullable
column, migration outbound-consent). RouteService.execute passes 'route_forward';
calendar reminders pass 'meeting_reminder'. CMP-DENY → command BLOCKED, no send.
2 tests: receipt recorded on allow, purpose-DENY blocks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task S2.1: the broker now checks consent (cmp.checkPurpose) after the OPA gate +
obligations and before the provider — a DENY blocks the send (BLOCKED/CONSENT_DENIED,
provider never called); ALLOW/NOT_REQUIRED proceed, ALLOW carrying the consent
receipt. Contracts gain CapabilityRequest.purpose + CapabilityResult.consentReceiptRef.
FakeCmp is now purpose-aware (denyPurpose/allowOnly). 5 new tests: allow+receipt,
deny→blocked, not-required, purpose-aware, OPA-before-CMP.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 9.5: /health now reports the egress provider backing each channel (sandbox
vs http). scripts/smoke-capability.mjs proves the slice end to end: sandbox egress
SENT through the broker; EMAIL routed to the env-gated HttpProvider and actually
delivered to a LOCAL echo server (real egress, no external network, no credentials);
idempotent replay; /health bindings. App wires CapabilityModule.
P9 slice-1 verification: 103 tests green, pnpm -r build all packages+demos,
boundary clean, capability smoke PASS, all prior smokes (realtime/inbox/support/
adapter/route/ai/calendar) still PASS through the broker.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 9.4: certifyProvider runs the P9 conformance checklist a provider must pass
before backing a channel — declares explicit capabilities, returns providerRef +
recognized outcome (never throws), repeatable/idempotent, tolerates empty payload.
2 tests: SandboxProvider passes; a throwing/no-capability provider fails with the
specific failing checks listed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 9.3: OutboundService now delegates the execute step to CapabilityBroker
(policy-gated + obligation-enforced) instead of calling a provider directly, while
keeping idempotency + rate-limit + the command/attempt ledger. BLOCKED obligations
→ command BLOCKED; a fail-closed throw marks the command FAILED then propagates.
AdaptersModule imports CapabilityModule; P4/P6/P8 egress now flows through the
broker unchanged. Updated 6 spec constructions; added a DENY_OUTBOUND test.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 7.6: apps/ai-studio (Vite, port 5177) — ingest a message, run CLASSIFY/
SUMMARIZE/EXTRACT, see proposal cards with confidence, evidence citations,
abstention, model/cost + a budget meter, and accept/reject; built on the ai-web
SDK via AiProvider. scripts/smoke-ai.mjs proves the P7 guarantees end to end:
auto-CLASSIFY → AI flag → routing REVIEW/DENY never ALLOW (KG-05), summary cites
evidence, EXTRACT stays DISCUSSION (Scenario 7), replay-once, accept.
P7 verification: 79 tests green (3x stable), pnpm -r build all packages+demos,
boundary passes and fails on ai-web->service, smoke-ai PASS, prior smokes
(realtime/inbox/support/adapter/route) PASS.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 7.4: route-simulator now unions RULE flags with persisted AI moderation
flags before decide() — so AI flags influence routing exactly like rule flags,
only ever REVIEW/DENY, never ALLOW. SUMMARY/TRANSCRIPT/DIGEST previews render a
proposed AI summary (aiSourced flag) instead of the P6 stub, still preview-only.
AiProjector auto-runs CLASSIFY on interaction.normalized (channel-bearing only),
idempotent via claim(). 4 tests prove KG-05: AI flag forces REVIEW on an
auto-ALLOW binding, DENY on CHILD, AI summary in preview with 0 sends, projector
idempotency. Full suite 79 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 7.3: AiJobService runs scoped/purposed AI jobs that only propose — fails
closed via OPA (KG-03), degrades on budget (AiBudgetGuard sums costUnits, KG-12),
then persists job+modelRun+artifact(PROPOSED)+claims+evidence with full
provenance. CLASSIFY also proposes IiosModerationFlag(proposedBy:'AI'). accept/
reject record human feedback + emit events. Idempotent per job key. INFERENCE_PORT
binds LocalDeterministicInference for nest start; specs inject testkit FakeInference.
8 tests: classify/summarize/extract, fail-closed, budget-degrade, idempotent, accept.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 7.2: FakeInference implements the InferencePort with keyword vocabulary
mirroring the P6 RuleEngine; deterministic (no clock/random) so AI artifacts are
replayable. Golden fixtures (AI_GOLDEN) + inference.spec.ts assert byte-identical
replay, abstention, and Scenario-7 (EVENT never exceeds DISCUSSION certainty).
Controls: abstain()/deny()/setCost().
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
POST /v1/adapters/:type/webhook verifies HMAC (fail-closed) -> stores raw ->
emits raw.received -> 202. RawEventProjector consumes it off the relay, normalizes
via the adapter, reuses IngestService (traceId threaded raw->interaction).
Deduped on (channelType, externalEventId). rawBody enabled. 48 tests.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Root cause of 'waiting for escalations': no queue/membership meant tickets were
never assigned. Now: createTicket find-or-creates a default queue; new joinDefault
endpoint + useGoOnline hook; agent-demo joins+goes-AVAILABLE on load (assignPending
picks up any waiting ticket). smoke-support self-seeds (no seed script needed).
Also: vitest singleFork to end cross-file DB races (45 tests deterministic).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
message-demo gains a per-person Inbox rail (useInbox, done/snooze); sending
surfaces a NEEDS_REPLY item in the other pane; reading auto-resolves it.
smoke-inbox.mjs proves the event-driven flow end-to-end (send -> relay ->
projector -> inbox -> read -> DONE). Realtime smoke still passes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
InboxService.list (fail-closed) + transition (OPEN/SNOOZED/DONE/STALE/ARCHIVED
state machine, owner-only, state-history). GET /v1/inbox/items + PATCH
/v1/inbox/items/:id. Moved SessionVerifier to global IdentityModule (shared by
message + inbox, no circular imports). 35 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Event-driven projector creates/collapses NEEDS_REPLY items from message.sent
(traceId propagated; inbox.item.created emitted) and resolves them to DONE on
message.read; idempotent via processed-event ledger. markRead now emits a
message.read outbox event (atomic). OutboxRelay runs on a 500ms timer in the
app (off in tests). Shared resetDb (TRUNCATE CASCADE) fixes cross-spec FK
isolation. 32 tests green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>