Files
iios/packages/iios-service/src/platform/session.verifier.ts
T
maaz519 3298401772 feat: enforce realtime delegation audience on the message socket
The socket used to accept any valid token, so a full REST/actor token could open the
live stream. Now it can require a narrowly-scoped delegated token (aud=iios-message),
so a leaked socket token can't drive privileged REST, and vice-versa.

- MessagePrincipal gains `audience`, surfaced from both verify paths (OIDC aud, and the
  app-token `aud` claim).
- message.gateway: when IIOS_REALTIME_AUDIENCE is set, handleConnection accepts only a
  token whose aud matches (opt-in, like IIOS_REQUIRE_ATTESTATION; unset = no change).
- spec: verifier surfaces aud; gateway accepts iios-message, rejects iios-core / no-aud
  when enforcing, passes through when off.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-15 12:56:19 +05:30

172 lines
7.2 KiB
TypeScript

import { createPublicKey } from 'node:crypto';
import { Injectable, OnModuleInit, UnauthorizedException } from '@nestjs/common';
import jwt from 'jsonwebtoken';
import type { MessagePrincipal } from '../messaging/message.service';
/** One trusted OIDC issuer (a Supabase project / IdP) → the app scope it maps to. */
interface IssuerEntry {
issuer: string; // the token `iss` claim, e.g. https://<ref>.supabase.co/auth/v1
jwksUrl: string;
appId: string;
orgId: string;
audience: string;
kidToPem: Map<string, string>;
}
/**
* The `session` port. Verifies whatever token a caller presents:
*
* 1. OIDC / JWKS (real IdPs) — a REGISTRY of trusted issuers (env `AUTH_ISSUERS`,
* or the single `SUPABASE_URL` shorthand). A token is routed by its `iss` claim
* to that issuer's entry, verified against that issuer's public JWKS (ES256, no
* secret), and stamped with that entry's `appId`/`orgId`. So two projects/IdPs
* map to two isolated app scopes on one IIOS — app A's tokens can't reach app B.
*
* 2. App token (dev / HS256) — legacy per-app secrets from `APP_SECRETS`, keyed by
* the `appId` claim. Unchanged; used by the dev IdP + tests.
*
* A Session Broker would later collapse case 1 to a single issuer (the Broker's PAT).
*/
@Injectable()
export class SessionVerifier implements OnModuleInit {
private readonly appSecrets: Record<string, string>;
private readonly issuers = new Map<string, IssuerEntry>(); // keyed by issuer string
constructor() {
try {
this.appSecrets = JSON.parse(process.env.APP_SECRETS ?? '{}');
} catch {
this.appSecrets = {};
}
for (const cfg of this.readIssuerConfig()) {
const url = this.normalize(cfg.url);
const appId = cfg.appId?.trim() || 'portal-demo';
const issuer = cfg.issuer?.trim() || `${url}/auth/v1`;
const jwksUrl = cfg.jwksUrl?.trim() || `${url}/auth/v1/.well-known/jwks.json`;
this.issuers.set(issuer, {
issuer,
jwksUrl,
appId,
orgId: cfg.orgId?.trim() || `org_${appId}`,
audience: cfg.audience?.trim() || 'authenticated',
kidToPem: new Map(),
});
}
}
async onModuleInit(): Promise<void> {
await Promise.all([...this.issuers.values()].map((e) => this.refreshJwks(e)));
}
/** Assemble the issuer registry from AUTH_ISSUERS (multi) or SUPABASE_URL (single, back-compat). */
private readIssuerConfig(): Array<{ url: string; appId?: string; orgId?: string; issuer?: string; jwksUrl?: string; audience?: string }> {
const out: Array<{ url: string; appId?: string; orgId?: string; issuer?: string; jwksUrl?: string; audience?: string }> = [];
try {
const raw = process.env.AUTH_ISSUERS;
if (raw) {
const parsed = JSON.parse(raw) as Array<{ url: string; appId?: string; orgId?: string; issuer?: string; jwksUrl?: string; audience?: string }>;
if (Array.isArray(parsed)) out.push(...parsed.filter((e) => e && (e.url || e.issuer)));
}
} catch {
/* ignore malformed AUTH_ISSUERS */
}
const single = process.env.SUPABASE_URL?.trim();
if (single && !out.length) {
out.push({ url: single, appId: process.env.SUPABASE_APP_ID?.trim(), orgId: process.env.SUPABASE_ORG_ID?.trim() });
}
return out;
}
/** Fetch one issuer's JWKS and cache each key as PEM (so verify() stays synchronous). */
private async refreshJwks(entry: IssuerEntry): Promise<void> {
try {
const res = await fetch(entry.jwksUrl);
if (!res.ok) return;
const { keys } = (await res.json()) as { keys: Array<Record<string, unknown>> };
const next = new Map<string, string>();
for (const jwk of keys ?? []) {
const kid = jwk.kid as string | undefined;
if (!kid) continue;
try {
next.set(kid, createPublicKey({ key: jwk as never, format: 'jwk' }).export({ type: 'spki', format: 'pem' }) as string);
} catch {
/* skip a key we can't import */
}
}
if (next.size) entry.kidToPem = next;
} catch {
/* keep whatever keys we already have */
}
}
verify(token: string): MessagePrincipal {
const decoded = jwt.decode(token, { complete: true }) as { header?: { alg?: string; kid?: string }; payload?: jwt.JwtPayload } | null;
if (!decoded?.payload) throw new UnauthorizedException('invalid token');
if (this.issuers.size && decoded.header?.alg === 'ES256') {
const iss = decoded.payload.iss ? String(decoded.payload.iss) : '';
const entry = this.issuers.get(iss);
if (!entry) throw new UnauthorizedException(`untrusted issuer: ${iss || '(none)'}`);
return this.verifyOidc(token, decoded.header.kid, entry);
}
return this.verifyAppToken(token, decoded.payload);
}
/** Verify an ES256 SAT against its issuer's JWKS key, mapping to that issuer's app scope. */
private verifyOidc(token: string, kid: string | undefined, entry: IssuerEntry): MessagePrincipal {
const pem = kid ? entry.kidToPem.get(kid) : undefined;
if (!pem) {
void this.refreshJwks(entry); // rotated / not loaded — pull fresh for next time
throw new UnauthorizedException('unknown signing key — retry');
}
let payload: jwt.JwtPayload;
try {
payload = jwt.verify(token, pem, { algorithms: ['ES256'], issuer: entry.issuer, audience: entry.audience }) as jwt.JwtPayload;
} catch {
throw new UnauthorizedException('invalid token');
}
const email = payload.email ? String(payload.email).toLowerCase() : undefined;
const meta = (payload.user_metadata ?? {}) as { full_name?: string; name?: string };
// userId = email (stable + human-readable → mentions/directory work); RealMDM canonicalises `sub` later.
const userId = email ?? String(payload.sub);
return {
userId,
appId: entry.appId,
orgId: entry.orgId,
tenantId: undefined,
displayName: meta.full_name ?? meta.name ?? email ?? userId,
audience: typeof payload.aud === 'string' ? payload.aud : entry.audience,
};
}
/** Legacy per-app HS256 token (dev IdP / host apps). */
private verifyAppToken(token: string, decodedPayload: jwt.JwtPayload): MessagePrincipal {
const appId = decodedPayload.appId ? String(decodedPayload.appId) : undefined;
if (!appId) throw new UnauthorizedException('missing appId claim');
const secret = this.appSecrets[appId];
if (!secret) throw new UnauthorizedException(`unknown app: ${appId}`);
let payload: jwt.JwtPayload;
try {
payload = jwt.verify(token, secret, { algorithms: ['HS256'] }) as jwt.JwtPayload;
} catch {
throw new UnauthorizedException('invalid app token');
}
if (!payload.sub) throw new UnauthorizedException('missing sub claim');
return {
userId: String(payload.sub),
appId,
orgId: payload.orgId ? String(payload.orgId) : `org_${appId}`,
tenantId: payload.tenantId ? String(payload.tenantId) : undefined,
displayName: payload.name ? String(payload.name) : undefined,
audience: typeof payload.aud === 'string' ? payload.aud : undefined,
};
}
/** Accept a project URL in any shape (…/rest/v1, …/auth/v1, trailing slash). */
private normalize(url: string): string {
return url.trim().replace(/\/+$/, '').replace(/\/(rest|auth)\/v1$/, '');
}
}